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TIDE QUICKENING OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION :
CANADIAN AERO SERVICES V. O'IVIALLEY
STANLEY 1NI . BECK*
Toronto
Save for two decisions, one in the twelfth and one ' in the
ninety-eighth year of its life, there would be little of real sig-
nificance to comment upon in the work of the Supreme Court of
Canada in company law. A primary reason for this is non-legal :
a national commercial life of depth really only dates from the
end of the Second World War, a period of little more than thirty
years. As a result, the court has not been faced with a large
number of company cases. And even in the recent past it has not
been faced with many for two vital reasons. One .i s the rule in
Foss v. Harbottlel which has all but blocked shareholder entry
to the court room . The other is the enormous financial risk that
a shareholder runs in . commencing suit because of the Anglo-
Canadian rule that the losing party must pay the other side's
costs, including the costs of counsel, as well as his own.2 Within
the past few years, however, the climate for corporate litigation
has changed dramatically . New corporations Acts federally3 and
in Ontario¢ and British Columbia have reformed the rule in Foss
* Stanley flit . Beck, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto . This article was written while the author was a Visiting Fellow at
All Souls College, Oxford . I should like to express my appreciation to
the Warden and Fellows of All Souls College for their hospitality and to the
Canada Council and the Foundation for Legal Research in Canada whose
support made my stay in Oxford possible .
1 (1843), 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R . 189 . See, generally, Beck . An Analysis of
Foss v. Harbottle, in Ziegel, ed., Studies in Canadian Company Law,
Vol. 1 (1967), p . 545 ; Wedderburn, Shareholders Rights and the Rule in
Foss v. Harbottle, [1957] Camb . L.J . 194, [1958] Camb . L .J . 93 .
2 It is not often appreciated that the American rule is to the opposite
effect . That is each party to the litigation, regardless of the outcome, bears
his own counsel costs and the successful party recovers only a minor
portion of his other costs . While it is true that the contingent fee has
played the greatest role in spurring shareholder litigation in the United
States, it is also true that the different rule as to costs would by itself
make litigation a more rational and reasonable prospect .
3Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C ., 1974-75, c. 33, ss 231-233 .
4The Business Corporations Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c . 53, s . 99 .
Companies Act, S.B.C ., 1973, c . 18, s . 222 .
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v. Harbottle and provided relatively easy access to the court room .
And with a single stroke, the English Court of Appeal in Moir v.
Wallersteiner (No. 2)6 has knocked down the costs barrier by
ruling that a shareholder who acts reasonably in commencing a
derivative action is entitled to be compensated for his costs by
the true party in interest-the company, whatever the result of
the action .
Thus it is appropriate that as the Supreme Court enters its
second century it does so having recently, in Canadian Aero
Services Limited v. O'Malley,7 given a judgment that in the sweep
of its language and in its fluid approach to the regulation of cor-
porate fiduciaries, provides an essential lead for the entire Cana-
dian judiciary as the gates of shareholder litigation begin slowly to
open. The only other noteworthy company law decision was
rendered by the court in 1887 in North-West Transportation Co.
v. Beatty," a decision that was soon forgotten when it was over-
ruled by the Privy Council9 and a contrary and vitally important
principle established . But the reach of the language of Canaero
may well call for ~a reconsideration of Beatty and the Supreme
Court may yet have cause to re-establish the principle it first laid
down in 1887 . Further, the judgment in Canaero calls into
question the decision -of the Privy Council in Burland v. Earle, 1o
breaks the boundaries of fiduciary duty out of the rigid lines
that had been drawn from the judgment of the House of Lords
in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver," casts a shadow over the Supreme
Court's decision in Peso Silver Mines v. Cropper,12 raises doubts
6 [1975] 2 W.L.R . 389, [1975] 1 All E.R . 849 (C.A .) . There seems
little doubt that the Canadian courts will follow the lead of the Court
of Appeal in this case. The result is so sensible and functionally sound
that it would be almost perverse not to . Moreover, the difficult procedural
questions that are left to be worked out by the judgment in Wallersteiner
(No . 2) have already been solved federally and in Ontario and British
Columbia where, in each case, it is necessary to get the leave of a judge
of the trial division to commence the derivative action. The judge must
be satisfied that the shareholder is acting in good faith and that it is in
the best interests of the company that the action be brought before leave
may be granted. Thus the granting of leave satisfies the criteria laid down
by the Court of Appeal in Wallersteiner No . 2 and, absent some over-
riding consideration that arises during the trial, the trial judge should
order that the plaintiff-shareholder be fully compensated whatever the
outcome.
7 (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, rev'ing (1972), 32 D.L.R . (3d) 632
(Ont . C.A.), hereafter referred to as Canaero .
8(1887), 12 S.C.R . 598
9 (1887), 12 App. Cas . 589 (P.C.) .
to [1902] A.C. 83 (P.C .), rev'ing (1900), 27, O.A.R. 540 (Ont . C.A.) .
11 [1942] 1 All E.R . 378 (H.L.) .
12 (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C .) .
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about the accepted dicta of the House of Lords in Bell v. Lever
ros.13 that a director is free to compete with his company and
puts into a hazardous position any person who acts as a director
of interlocking firms.
Considering all that has been claimed for it, the facts and
actual decision in Canaero are unexceptional . The plaintiff com-
pany was- engaged in the business of topographical mapping and
geophysical exploration . M was a director, president and chief
executive officer of the company. Z was a director and executive
vice-president and an acknowledged leader in the field of topo-
graphical mapping. The company first became interested in the
possibility of an extensive aerial mapping project in Guyana in
1961 as a result of work done in nearby Surinam where condi-
tions were similar. Both M and Z spent time in Guyana in 1961
and 1962 preparing preliminary projects and consulting with
government officials . In 1962 and again in 1964 they did magne-
tometer and electromagnetic work in that country on a project
which Canadian Aero Services undertook for the United Nations.
Work on the mapping proposal ceased because of political
conditions in Guyana in 1962 but resumed again in 1965 when
it appeared that the project might be funded under Canada's
external aid programme. As a result, Z returned to Guyana and
in July, 1965 submitted a proposal to that government for topo-
graphical mapping of the country-a proposal that it used in
seeking Canadian government financing. Z recommended to his
company that it purchase a new aerial measuring device to use
on the project and it did so at a cost of $75,000.00. By early
,July, 1966 governmental negotiations concluded with the Cana-
diân government agreeing to finance the project and to select
the contractor with the concurrence of Guyana. M and Z were
in contact with officials of both governments during this time
and on July 15th, M wrote to the company's agent in Guyana
saying that he felt "the job was a certainty" 14 for Canadian Aero
Services .
n August 6th, M and Z incorporated T. Ltd. and shortly
thereafter resigned their positions with Canadian Aero Services.
On August 22nd, M informed the Canadian External Aid office
of the formation of T. Ltd. and on August 23rd, five companies,
including Canadian Aero Services and T. Ltd. were invited to
bid on the Guyana project . T. Ltd. was named the contractor
and entered into an agreement to carry out the programme for
$2,300,000.00. Canadian Aero Services brought suit against M
13 [19321 A.C . 161.
14 Supra, footnote 7, at p. 377.
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and Z alleging that they had breached their fiduciary duty to it
by depriving it of "the corporate opportunity which it had been
developing".1 -5 The action failed at trial and in the Ontario Court
of Appeal but succeeded before the Supreme Court.
The above facts clearly resemble those in Cook v. Deeks"
and the only wonder is that both the trial court and the Ontario
Court of Appeal could have reached the conclusion that there
had been no breach of fiduciary duty. Laskin J . (as he then was),
speaking for a unanimous17 Supreme Court, had little difficulty
in deciding that senior officers and employees's such as M 'and Z
could not spend a number of years developing a business oppor-
tunity for their company and then, when it was about to be
realized, leave their employment and seize the opportunity for
themselves : is
. . . the fiduciary relationship goes at least this far: a director or a
senior officer like O'Malley or Zarzyski is precluded from obtaining
for himself, either secretly or without the approval of the company
(which would have to be properly manifested upon full disclosure
of the facts), any property or business advantage either belonging
to the company or for which it has been negotiating ; and especially
is this so where the director or officer is a participant in the
negotiations on behalf of the company.
The fact that M and Z had resigned their positions with the
15 Ibid ., at p. 373. T. Ltd. was also joined in the action as was one
Wells, an Ottawa solicitor who joined in the incorporation of T. Ltd.
and was a shareholder .
16 [19161 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.) .
17 Coram : Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence and Laskln JJ.
is The Ontario Court of Appeal were concerned that neither M nor Z
had been properly appointed as directors. They concluded that as president
and executive vice-president respectively they were merely employees. As
such they owed no fiduciary duty to their company but were only held
to the employee standard of not revealing trade secrets . This is clearly
wrong, as Laskin J. pointed out. M and Z were the senior management
officers of the company and acted as such (whether properly appointed
or not) . As senior management they were subject to the same fiduciary
duties as directors. On this point, Laskin J. quoted from Gower, Modern
Company Law (3rd ed ., 1969) . p. 518 : ". . . these duties, except in so
far as they depend on statutory provisions expressly limited to directors, are
not so restricted but apply equally to any officials of the company who
are authorized to act on its behalf, and in particular to those acting in
a managerial capacity ." Moreover, both the Ontario Business Corporations
Act, supra, footnote 4, in s. 144 and the Canada Business Corporations
Act, supra, footnote 3, in s. 117 now hold directors and officers to the
same fiduciary standard .
19 Supra, footnote 7 at p. 382.
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company did not, in the circumstances, relieve them of their
fiduciary obligations :20
. . . he is also precluded from so acting [taking for himself or diverting
to an associate a maturing business opportunity] even after his resigna-
tion where the resignation may fairly be said to have been prompted
or influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity sought
by the company, or where it was his position with the company rather
than a fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity which he
later acquired .
There has been scant judicial discussion in the Common-
wealth cases of the doctrine of corporate opportunity. And indeed
there was little need for an elaboration of the parameters of the
doctrine in Canaero as the facts fit comfortably into the line of
cases dealing with directors who take for themselves opportunities
that first came to them while acting, and because they were so
acting, as directors. However, the view of the law taken by the
trial judge and affirmed by the Court of Appeal compelled the
Supreme Court to reconsider and reformulate the requirements
for liability set out in the cornerstone case of Regal (Hastings)
Ltd. v. Gulliver.21 It is this reformulation, which moves the Regal
20Ibid. On this point the decision is similar to that given by Roskill J.
in Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [1972] 2 All E.R.
162, [1972] 1 W.L.R . 443 . The opportunity which the defendant appro
priated came to his knowledge when he was a director of the plaintiff
company and his subsequent resignation did not terminate his fiduciary
duty . The decision in Cooley is also a full answer to the rather strange
idea advanced by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Canaero that,M and Z
were able to take up the opportunity in question not because of any
information that came to them while working for . Canadian Aero Services,
but because of "their own personal education, skill and knowledge". Surely
this is to, say no more than that they would have not been engaged in the
topographical mapping business but for their skill and knowledge whether
employed by someone else or self-employed . It has no bearing on the
question of whether they breached their fiduciary duty by taking up an
opportunity which, in the utilization of their personal skills, they first
worked on and developed while in the employ of Canadian Aero Services .
So it was in Cooley where the defendant managing director occupied that
position because of his architectural and engineering skills and was ap-
proached while still acting in that capacity to use those skills for another
in competition with his own company. For a discussion of Cooley see
Prentice, (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 623 . It may be that the Ontario Court
of Appeal was simply making the point that if 1VI and Z were considered
to be employees rather than officers or directors they were only subject
to the disability of not using trade secrets after they had left, their em-
ployment . As a matter of law, that is correct but it is an antiseptic view
of the facts in Canaero. See the discussion in footnote 18 .
21 Supra, footnote 11 . The principles of Regal were first adopted by
the Supreme Court in Zwicker v. ,Stanbury, [1952] 3 I .L.R. 273.
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doctrine out of narrow and rigid lines and substitutes a flexible
and more spacious standard, that gives the judgment in Canaero
its great importance . In his judgment at trial, Grant J. stressed
the requirement of Regal that the benefit or advantage must be
obtained "by reason and in course of their office of directors" .'==
As M and Z did not use any confidential information in gaining
the Guyana contract and as they had resigned and had not
therefore obtained it "in the course of their duties [as senior
officers or directors]"23 they were under no liability to account .
Laskin J. held this last point to be "too narrowly conceived",=}
and said that it was:25
. . . a mistake, . . ., to seek to encase the principle stated and applied
in Peso, by adoption from Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, in the
straight jacket of special knowledge acquired while acting as directors
or senior officers, let alone limiting it to benefits acquired by reason of
and during the holding of those offices .
The importance of this holding cannot be over-emphasized for
in the two previous cases in which the Supreme Court adopted
the Regal principle, Peso Silver Mines Ltd. v. Cropper211 and
Zwicker v. Stanbury,1' Lord Russell's test of "by reason and in
course of their office of directors"-'s had been particularly relied
upon by the court. Indeed, it was the rigid application of this
test that allowed the directors in Peso to escape liability.29 But
more than freeing the criterion of liability from the constraints
of "benefits acquired in the course and execution of their office",
Laskin J's . judgment, by refusing to limit liability to informa-
tion acquired while acting as a director, has left room for the
development of a realistic doctrine of corporate opportunity.
In a previous article3° the question was posed whether if
the facts of Regal were that one of the directors happened to
hear of an available theatre and personally took a lease of it
when he knew his company was looking for another location,
2-Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, supra, footnote 11, at p. 386,
per Lord Russell of Killowen .
23 (1970), 61 Can. Pat. Rep. 1, at p. 39 .
-} Supra, footnote 7, at p. 387.
=5 Ibid ., at p. 390.
_6 Supra, footnote 12 .
27 Supra, footnote 21 .
-` Supra, footnote 22 .
=s For a criticism of the various applications of this test in Peso
see Beck, The Saga of Peso Silver Mines : Corporate Opportunity Recon-
sidered (1971), 49 Can, Bar Rev. 80, at pp . 105-114. The directors in
Zwicker were clearly acting as directors in taking the opportunity for
themselves and there was no difficulty in applying the Regal test .
30Ibid ., at p. 107.
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should -he not be held to be a constructive trustee of the lease?
The answer given, on the state of the Anglo-Canadian law at
that time, was that he probably would not be but it was sug-
gested "that he should be liable even if the knowledge of the
availability of the theatre did not come to him in his capacity as
director . . . [FI]e is a fiduciary and if - the circumstances are such
that the interests of his principal call for protection, he should
be required to look first to those interests rather than to his
own".31 This is the position that the growth of the corporate
opportunity doctrine has led to in the United States and as
Laskin J.'s judgment presages a similar development in Canada,
it is proposed to look briefly at the American experience.32
31 Ibid .
32 For a discussion of the American case see Note, Corporate Op-
portunity (1960-61), 74 Harv . L . Rev . 765 . It has been suggested that
the decision in Industrial Development Ltd. v. Cooley, supra, footnote 20,
now allows the English law on corporate opportunity to be formulated
in a manner similar to the American doctrine, see Prentice, op . cit.,
footnote 20, at pp . 628-630. As welcome as Roskill J .'s judgment is in
that case, the facts and the decision do not fully support the broad
proposition . When the defendant was approached by the Eastern Gas
Board he was the managing director of the plaintiff company. The work
the Eastern Gas Board wished the defendant to leave his employment
to undertake was work the plaintiff had previously, although unsuccessfully,
been interested in securing . Even accepting that it might be said that the
defendant was approached in his private capacity, he still, at that time,
was the managing director of a company that had been interested in that
particular contract and however slim the plaintiff's chances were of
securing it, it was the defendant's duty, once he learned the project was
again active, to use his best efforts to secure it for the plaintiff rather
than to use his best efforts to secure it for himself while still employed as
managing director . It may be that the representative of the Eastern Gas
Board first, from his point of view, approached the defendant in his private
capacity in the sense that he did not at the time of the initial contact
know that the defendant was employed by the plaintiff, nor that the
plaintiff has been interested in the particular project . But, as Roskill d .
rightly pointed out, as long as the defendant occupied his position with
the plaintiff he "had one capacity and one capacity only . . . managing
director of the plaintiffs" and information which came to him in that
capacity "which was of concern to the plaintiffs and was relevant for the
plaintiffs to know, was information which it was his duty to pass on
to the plaintiffs . . ." (at p . 173, All E.R.) . This, indeed, has overtones of
the American corporate opportunity doctrine and has the great merit of
recognizing, as do the American cases and as does Laskin J . 's judgment in
Canaero, that information that directors and officers receive does not
come marked for them in different capacities . The corporate opportunity
doctrine requires that information that fairly ought to be given to the
company must be so given before a fiduciary may personally exploit it,
regardless of how, when, where or why the fiduciary first acquired it .
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A series of cases in the Delaware courts illustrate the
expansion of the corporate opportunity doctrine . The leading
early case is Guth v . Loft33 in which an "interest" or "expectancy"
test was formulated . The rule was said to be that if an oppor-
tunity comes to a director in his individual capacity and is one,34
. . . which by its nature falls into the line of the corporation's business
and is of practical advantage to it, or is an opportunity in which the
corporation has an actual or expectant interest, the officer is prohibited
from permitting his self-interest to be brought into conflict with the
corporations interest and may not take the opportunity for himself.
In Johnston v. Greene,35 the Delaware Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle of Guth v. Loft but made it clear that
"for the corporation to have an actual or expectant interest there
must be some tie between that property and the nature of the
corporate business" . 3 a By 1966, the same court reaffirmed the
basic rule but said that the fundamental question to be determined
in all such cases is : 37
. . . whether or not the director has appropriated something for himself
that, in all fairness, should belong to his corporation . The determination
of this question is always one of fact to be determined from the
objective facts and surrounding circumstances .
Thus the "interest" or "expectancy" test was said to have been
replaced by a broader "fairness" test . It will be appreciated how
far this is from a limiting test of "in the course and execution of
their office" . One further American case well illustrates the reach
of a court's equitable jurisdiction in applying a standard of
fairness .
In Rosenblum v . Judson Engineering Corporation's the
defendants were directors and officers of a company that manu-
factured tools for automobile wheel alignment. One of the defen
dants personally acquired a licence to manufacture a new wheel
balancing machine and a partnership was formed to which the
licence was transferred . It was accepted that the opportunity did
not come to the defendant directors in their capacity as directors
of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had no present interest or
expectancy in the new business, that the new business was not
essential to its present needs and was not directly competitive
with it . Yet, applying the corporate opportunity doctrine, the
33 (l939), 5 A. 2d 503 (S . C . Del.) .
34 Ibid ., at p . 511 .
35 (1956), 21 A. 2d 919 (S . C . Del .) .
3s Ibid., at p . 924 .
37 The Equity Corporation v . Milton (1966), 221 A. 2d 494 (S . C . Del .) .
38 (1954), 109 A . 2d 559 (S.C.N .H .) .
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court imposed a constructive trust on the partnership. In so
doing, the court rejected the present interest or expectancy test
as being "too lax a conception of the requirements of fiduciary
loyalty" .39 It also noted that bad faith, in the sense of using
corporate funds or resources, or confidential information, or
information gained while acting as directors or officers was not
essential to the establishment of liability : 49
The fact that a business opportunity is itself of such a nature that
under the particular circumstances of the case it should fairly belong
to the corporation is sufficient to establish a duty . . . to acquire it
for the corporation .
The immateriality in Rosenblum of there not being bad faith
in the sense of not using confidential information is extremely
important. The idea that the information that a director makes
use of must be confidential to the company for liability to attach
is one that has bedevilled the Anglo-Canadian cases.41 It is not
the least of the merits of Laskin J's. judgment in Canaero that it
also clears up this point. In Canaero, the trial judge concluded
that M and Z had not used confidential information acquired while
they had been employed by Canadian Aero Services to gain the
Guyana contract and whether considered to be directors or
employees they would only be liable after they had resigned,
given the trial judge's strict application of the test in Regal, if.
they had used such information. As to this Laskin J. said : 42
The view taken by the trial judge, and affirmed by the Court of
Appeal, tended to obscure the difference between the survival . of
fiduciary duty after resignation and the right to use non-confidential
information acquired in the course of employment and as a result of
experience . I do not see that . . . the question of the confidentiality of
the information acquired by M and Z in the course of their work for
Canaero . . . is relevant to the enforcement against them of a fiduciary
duty . The fact that breach of confidence . . . may itself afford a ground
of relief does not make [it] a necessary ingredient of a successful
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
39 [bid ., at p . 563 .
40 Ibid . The same broader approach was approved by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc . (1948;,
80 N.E . 2d 552 . The court approved the statement in Ballentine on
Corporations (1946), p . 204, that " . . . the true basis of the doctrine should
not be found in any expectancy or property interest concept, but in the
unfairness on the particular facts of a fiduciary taking advantage of an
opportunity when the interests of the corporation justly call for protection.
This calls for the application of ethical standards of what is fair and
equitable to particular sets of facts" . See also Production Mach. Co . v .
Howe (1951), 99 N.E . 2d 32 (S . C . Mass .) in which this standard was
applied .
41 For a criticism of this notion
pp. 109-112 .
42 Supra, footnote 7, at p . 388 .
see Beck, op . cit ., footnote 29, at
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The corporate opportunity doctrine, which asks the broader
equitable question of whether, on a consideration of all the facts,
the interests of the corporation justly call for protection, sweeps
aside the legal question of whether there is a property right in
information. It was this latter question that concerned all of the
judges in Phipps v. Boardman43 At the trial, Wilberforce J.
referred to what the trustees learned as "essentially the property
of the trust".44 In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning, M.R.,
spoke of the "information or knowledge which [the agent] has
been employed . . . to collect or discover, or which he has other-
wise acquired, for the use of his principal" as being "the property
of his principal . . ." .45 In the House of Lords, Viscount Djl-
horne,46 Lord Hodson47 and Lord Guest" agreed that knowledge
acquired while acting for the principal could be regarded as the
principal's property. In his dissent, a dissent which found favour
with the Ontario Court of Appeal in Canaero, Lord Upjohn
remarked that "in general, information is not property at all" ,49
but agreed that if the information acquired were confidential or
was acquired "in a fiduciary capacity" and was "capable of
being used . . . to injure the trust" 5° an action would lie . An
almost identical position was taken by Cartwright J., speaking
for a unanimous Supreme Court, one year prior to Phipps v.
Boardman, in Peso: 51
There is no suggestion in the evidence that the offer to the appellant
was accompanied by any confidential information unavailable to
any prospective purchaser or that the respondent as director had
access to any information by reason of his office .
It is suggested that all of the above formulations reduce to
asking whether the fiduciary has put himself in a position where
his duty and his interest conflict, subject to the limiting qual
ification that he must have been acting in his official capacity
when the information came his way.52 One rationale put forward
43 [196712 A.C . 46 .
44 [1964] 2 All E.R. 187, at p. 204.
45 [1965) Ch . 992, at pp. 1018-1019 (emphasis added by Lord
Denning) .
46 Supra, footnote 43, at pp . 89-90.
47Ibid., at p. 107.
4s Ibid ., at p. 115.
49Ibid ., at p. 127.
50 Ibid ., at pp . 128-129 (emphasis added by Lord Upjohn).
51 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 10 .
52 This leaves aside, for the moment, Lord Upjohn's requirement that
the information must have been capable of injuring the principal. This
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for the "information is property" point is that for a shareholders'
derivative action to proceed there must be an allegation of fraud,
that is an appropriation of corporate property . This requirement
would be satisfied if the information were confidential or could
otherwise be said to belong to the corporation. But, as Laskin
J.'s judgment makes clear, an action will lie whenever there has
been a taking of property, including an opportunity, that in
equity belongs to the corporation. It is the opportunity seized
that is the property, in its widest sense, not the information used,
whether confidential or not. The notion of a taking of corporate
property was only, in effect, a procedural device to let a minority
shareholder through the barrier of Foss v. Harbottle and into the
court room . With the reform of Foss v. Harbottle, 53 it would
be preferable if notions of corporate property were dropped
altogether . The crux of the matter is the proper scope of fiduciary
obligation and it is on that which the courts should concentrate.54
Which is not to say that confidential information may not be
considered to be corporate property for wrongful use 'of which,
as an insider trading, an action will lie to recover the profit
gained.55
In sum, what the argument over property finally reduces
to, as do most arguments about property, is whether there are
legitimate interests that call for the protection of the law. The
problem with respect to the corporate opportunity doctrine is to
define the limits of the corporation's interest in such a way that
directors and officers are given viable guidelines for their con-
duct. But clear definition is simply not possible, or desirable,
when one is dealing with the interaction of human conduct and
an infinite variety of commercial situations . And this is the
conclusion that Laskin J. came to when, after noting that what
view is clearly not in accord with the law, whatever its merits, and will
be discussed infra . See, e.g ., Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v . Gulliver, supra,
footnote 11 . The decision in Phipps itself is, of course authority against
this proposition, as is Industrial Development Consultants v . Cooley,
supra, footnote ; 20, at pp . 175-176 (All E.R.) . "It is no answer to the
application of the rule that the profit is of a kind which the company could
not itself have obtained, or that no loss is caused to the company by
the gain of the director" . Furs Ltd . v. Tomkies (1936), 54 C.L.R . 583,
per Rich, Dixon and Ewatt, JJ ., at p . 592 .
53 Supra, footnotes 3, 4 and 5 .
54 The judgment of Gibbs J ., in the Australian High Court in
Consul Development Pty . Ltd. v . DPC Estates Pty . Ltd . (1975), 5 A.L.R .
231, at pp . 248-252 takes this broader approach. For a critical essay on
the development of fiduciary obligation by the courts _see Weinrib, The
Fiduciary Obligation (1975), 25 U . of T . L . J . 1 .
55 Diamond v. Oreamuno (1969), 248 N.E . 2d 910 (N.Y.C.A .) . See
also Gower, op . cit., footnote 18, p . 547 .
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emerges from the American cases is "an imprecise ethical stan-
dard"56 he warned that in holding that "there was a breach of
duty by M and Z that survived their resignations, I am not to
be taken as laying down any rule of liability to be read as if it
were a statute".", Rather "in this developing branch of the law,
the particular facts may determine the shape of the principle of
decision without setting fixed limits to it".58
The most that Laskin J. felt he could sensibly provide as
guidelines for the lower courts once the boundaries "applied in
Peso, by adoption from Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v . Gulliver"59 had
been loosed, was to generalize about the factors to be considered : so
The general standards of loyalty, good faith and avoidance o£ a
conflict of duty and self-interest to which the conduct of a director
or senior officer must conform, must be tested in each case by
many factors which it would be reckless to attempt to enumerate
exhaustively . Among them are the factor of position or office held,
the nature of the corporate opportunity, its ripeness, its specificness and
the director's or managerial officer's relation to it, the amount of
knowledge possessed, the circumstances in which it was obtained
and whether it was special or, indeed, even private . . . .
It may be objected that these criteria are too generalized
and that an "imprecise ethical standard" is too vague a guide
to conduct and therefore unfair. Are not corporate executives and
their advisors entitled to demand from the law some reasonably
certain rules of permissible conduct? The merit of the Regal test
was that it provided just such a relatively certain standard . This
argument is only superficially attractive for the corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine is really no more vague or difficult to apply than
the Regal test while at the same time recognizing the functional
reality of commercial life . Information that directors and officers
receive does not come marked for them in their different capac-
ities. They are men who are engaged in a particular business
and they receive information relevant to that business because
of that fact, whether the information is received in their offices,
in the boardroom or on the golf course . A corporation is not a
receptacle of information apart from its senior management;
directors and officers are almost invariably the pipeline through
which information is filtered to directorial management as a
whole. The corporate opportunity doctrine requires that if the
corporation has a present interest in the opportunity, or an
56 Supra, footnote 7, at p. 385.
57Ibid ., at p. 391.
58Ibid., at p. 390 .
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., at p. 39 l.
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expectancy in the sense that it is an opportunity that it has begun
to look for, or is an opportunity in which it has no present
interest or expectancy but is one in which it might reasonably
be expected to be interested given its present line of business,
then the ,fiduciary must present it to the corporation for its con-
sideration prior to exploiting it himself. Uncertainty is simply
and quickly resolved by fully informing the corporation and
abiding by its independent decision. If it be objected that this
may make the directors and officerssi the only persons who may
not exploit the opportunity the answer, once again, is that the
opportunity would, in most instances, never have come their way
but for the positions they occupy, whether it came to them while
acting in that position or not, and their first duty is to look to the
interests of their company.s 2
The broad principles enunciated in Canaero, and it is clear
from the judgment that a unanimous Supreme Court was inten-
tionally articulating general principles, clearly have implications
beyond the immediate decision . The court's own decision in
Peso"s notwithstanding Laskin J.'s careful distinguishing of it,
particularly must be reconsidered . Peso was distinguisheds4 on the
grounds that the company was continuously being offered mining
properties, the claims in question were not essential to the success
of the company and, most importantly, because of a finding of
good faith rejection of the claims by the company. This decision
has been criticized in a previous articles5 and it is sufficient to
highlight the essential facts that call for its reinterpretation in
light of Canaero and its abandonment of the Regal test .
61 In the United States the fiduciary duties owed by directors and
officers has been extended to controlling shareholders ; see Pepper v . Litton
(1939), 308 U.S. 295 ; Pearlman v . Feldmann (1955), 219 F . 2d 173
(2nd Cir .) ; Jones v . Ahmanson (1969), 460 P . 2d 464 (Cal. S . C .) . This
makes eminent good sense and recognizes the reality of corporate control.
Those who are in a position to control and run a corporation's affairs
should be held to be in a fiduciary relationship regardless of whether
they have been elected to an office or prefer to have their nominees so
elected .
62 It must be emphasized that the corporate opportunity doctrine
does not impose an affirmative obligation on directors in the sense that
they would be in breach of duty for not passing information on to the
corporation as opposed to actually exploiting it. For a discussion of
this point see Prentice, op . cit ., footnote 20, at pp . 626-627 .
63 Supra, footnote 12 .
64 Supra, footnote 7, at p . 390 . The main use of the Peso decision
by counsel for the defendants was to show a recent reaffirmation of the
test in Regal by the Supreme Court . The abandonment of this test by
the court has been dealt with in the text above and on this point at
least, Peso must be considered to be overruled.
65 Beck, op . cit ., footnote 29 .
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The controlling shareholders, directors and officers, in
concert with the company's geologist, formed a group to purchase
the claims in question six weeks after their rejection by the com
pany . The principal reason given for rejection was insufficient
capital. The person in charge of finances was the controlling
director. Among the reasons given for the purchase were that
"we [Peso Silver Mines] were achieving good results" and "we
wanted to protect the interests of the company [Peso]".,.,,
These facts raise the corporate opportunity doctrine in its
most difficult context-the taking up of the opportunity by the
controlling directors after rejection, albeit in good faith, by the
company. Is it ever possible for a court to determine good faith
on such facts? When financial inability is the reason for rejection
and the board, or some part of it, is responsible for financial
policy, is not the task almost impossible?67 Acourt cannot do more
than guess in judging individual motivations and actions in such
a complex corporate situation and it should not set itself the
66Ibid ., at p. 99.
67 The soundest approach to financial inability is that taken by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Irving Trust v. Deutsch
(1934), 73 F. 2d 121, at p. 124: "The defendant's argument that the
fiduciary principle can have no application where the corporation is
unable to undertake the venture is not convincing. If directors are permitted
to justify their conduct on such a theory there will be a temptation to
refrain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of the corporation
since, if it does not meet the obligations, an opportunity of profit will be
open to them personnally."
Moreover, the opportunity itself might be sufficient to generate a
new supply of funds. The best approach for the courts to take might be
to require the board to take every reasonable step to enable the company
to take advantage of the opportunity including a showing of reasonable and
diligent efforts to raise the necessary funds. See, generally, Note, Financial
Inability as a Defence under the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine (1951),
29 Kentucky L.J . 229.
Financial inability is a species of the impossibility defence-a
defence that was rejected, in the particular circumstances, in both Canaero
and Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, supra, footnote 20 .
In Canaero the defence was that as Canadian Aero Services was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of an American company it was extremely
unlikely that the Canadian External Aid office would award the contract
to it in line with its known policy . In Cooley the defence was that the
Eastern Gas Board had previously refused to grant the contract to the
plaintiff company and its chances of subsequently so doing were accepted
as being less than ten per cent . In both cases the court said, in effect,
that it did not lie in the mouth of the fiduciary to say that it was unlikely
or impossible for the company to exploit the opportunity when it was
his first duty to bend his every effort to make its exploitation possible
rather than take it up himself. The decision in Phipps v. Boardman, supra,
footnote 43, is to the same effect .
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task. If directors or senior officers wish to take up the oppor-
tunity then the requirement stipulated by Laskin J. in Canaero,
". . . approval of the company . . . properly manifested upon full
disclosure of the facts . . ."ss should be fulfilled . In the case of
controlling directors, "approval of the company" must be inter-
preted to mean approval by the shareholders if it is to have real
meaning. The rejection of an opportunity by a company is one
thing; the subsequent acquisition of that opportunity by directors
or senior officers is quite another and must be dealt with on its
own terms. The same requirement of full disclosure and indepen-
dent approval would also apply to Canaero's expanded concept
of corporate opportunity. That is, a fiduciary should be required to
present the opportunity to the corporation prior to exploiting it
himself if it is one "which in fairness should belong to the corpo-
ration", 69 whether the corporation was then aware of it or not.7°
'Full disclosure to the company and independent approval
by it raises the question of the principle in North-West Trans-
portation v. igeatty.71 It was the decision of the privy Council that
a director was entitled to use his votes qua shareholder, in this
case controlling shareholder, to approve his own contract with
the company. Moreover, . the holding of Pender v. Lushington?2
that a shareholder is entitled to exercise his vote "from motives
or promptings of what he considers his own individual interest"
was reaffirmed . But as Laskin J. noted in Canaero in commenting
on fiduciary obligation in the context of the modern corporation
". . . new fact situations may require a reformulation of existing
principle to maintain its vigour in the new setting".73 And
Canaero may well require the Supreme Court to reformulate the
principle of North-West Transportation by reverting to its original
holding of 1887 that : 74
. . . fair play and common sense alike dictate that if the transaction
and act of the directors are to be confirmed it should be by the
68 Supra, footnote 7, at p . 382 .
69Ibid ., at p . 385, quoting from slaughter, The Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine (1964), 18 southwestern L.J . 96 .
TO Even after full disclosure to and rejection by the corporation, the
fiduciary may still be banned from taking up the opportunity if there
has been a significant change in circumstances prior to the time of the
fiduciary's action which might affect the corporation's decision . This
might well have been the case in Peso where because the company "was
achieving 'good results" its controlling directors wished to protect adjacent
claims .
71 Supra, footnote 8 .
72 (1877), 6 Cb . D . 70, at p . 76 (C.A.) .
73 Supra, footnote 7, at p . 383 .
74 Supra, footnote 8, per Ritchie C.J., at p . 604 .
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impartial, independent, and intelligent judgment of the disinterested
shareholders, and not by the interested director himself who should
never have departed from his duty.
It is difficult to appreciate the case against this holding notwith-
standing that the Privy Council decision that overruled it has
stood for almost one hundred years.' ,̀ Certainty a director qua
shareholder is entitled to the same rights as his fellow share-
holders, including the right to the unfettered exercise of his vote.
But when the company, through its shareholders, is being asked
to pass on the conduct of one of its fiduciaries, the answer surely
must be uninfluenced by the power of the fiduciary himself . In
what other fiduciary situation, whether it be trustee-cestui que
trust, principal-agent or solicitor-client, would the law allow the
fiduciary to be seen to influence and even control the decision
of the principal? The fact that the director is also a shareholder
should not blind the court to the fact that in the particular context
he is a fiduciary who is asking permission or absolution . As such
he ought not to be allowed to use his votes to influence or control
the decision . If the director involved is not part of the control
group, whether of directors and senior officers or shareholders,
then disclosure to and unanimous approval by his fellow directors
seems an adequate precaution . There is no need for independent
shareholder approval. Where the director is part of the control
group, or if he is not but there is dissenting opinion among his
fellow directors, then the requirement should be that the matter
must be placed before the general meeting.' ,' If it is objected
<5The case for the Privy Council decision is that where the majority
are disenfranchised the minority will be allowed to rule . In the modern
context this does not take account of the reality of management control
.of the proxy machinery in the public company. And why should the
minority decide other than what is in the best commercial interests of
the company as a whole? In the private company there is a good deal
to be said for minority rule where the matter is one concerning the
fiduciary obligations of the majority . Most importantly, the decision of
the Privy Council was premised on the defendant's good faith and the
commercial soundness of the transaction . The majority will not be
allowed to use its votes where to do so would be fraudulent or oppressive
and this is said to be a sufficient check on the majority . It may be
asked why shareholders should be forced to the uncertainties and expense
of derivative actions to be protected from an overreaching majority?
It might be objected that such a requirement is impractical in the
sense that the opportunity will no longer be available by the time a
shareholders' meeting is held . This might well be the case but again the
answer is that such a procedure will act as a useful check on fiduciaries
being tempted to take up such opportunities . If, once again, this puts
them in the position of being the only persons not able to take up
the opportunity the answer is that their position is one that entails
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that this is a naive requirement in the sense that in the public
company the directors will control the shareholder vote in any
event through control of the proxy machinery, the answer is that
the requirement of full, public disclosure is the essential check,
not the fact of the vote itself . Here the aphorism that "sunlight
is the best disinfectant" rings true .
The decision of the Privy Council in Burland v. Farle"
also requires reconsideration in light of Canaero. Indeed, it could
well be argued that Burland failed to survive the House of Lord's
decision in Regal. In Burland, the president and general manager
of the company purchased a plant in a related business "with the
idea of immediately selling it to [his] company" .7s The plant
was purchased for $21,000.00 and resold to the company for
$60,000.00. In holding the president liable to account, the Ontario
Court of Appeal ruled that :79
The desirability of the company acquiring the property being apparent,
what was the duty of the president and general manager? Surely
to endeavour to acquire it for the company and not to purchase it
for himself.
The Privy Council disagreed and held that because there was
"no evidence whatever of any commission or mandate to Burland
to purchase on behalf of the company""" no liability to account
attached . The corporate opportunity doctrine is not circum-
scribed by any notion of "commission or mandate to purchase"
and it is clear that whether one applies a present-interest or
expectancy test,' or a more general test of fairness, that the holding
in Canaero would now require a different and more equitable
result on facts similar to those in Burland.
The broadening of the standard of fiduciary obligation in
Canaero raises particular problems for interlocking and competing
obligations that must be discharged and like other fiduciaries, such as
trustees, certain commercial activities may be foreclosed to them as a
result . The other side of this coin is that directors and senior officers
occupy positions of power and prestige in society which carry privileges
and monetary and psychic rewards that well compensate for such minor
disabilities that they may be under as fiduciaries .
77 Supra, footnote 10 . In fact, Burland is most often cited for its
discussion of Foss v. Harbottle, supra, footnote 1, rather than for the actual
decision .
7s Ibid ., at p. 560 (O.A.R.) .
79Ibid., at p. 540, per floss J.A ., at p. 561 .
so Supra, footnote 10, per Lord Davey, at pp . 98-99. Lord Davey also
remarked that "a person with a more generous regard for the company
of which he was president would have been disposed to give the company
the benefit of his purchase". A "more generous regard for the company"
may now be said to be the touchstone of the corporate opportunity doctrine .
7$$
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . LIII
directors. The vertical interlocking problem is primarily taken care
of by statutory provisions that require a director to declare his
interest and refrain from voting in any transaction in which he
is interested . The new Canada and Ontario Business Corporation
Acts have improved these provisions by requiring that the director
be acting honestly and in good fâith and that the transaction be
in the best interests of the corporation."' It is in the case of
horizontal interlocking, either in a parent-subsidiary situation,$' or
through being a director of a competing company, or otherwise
engaging in a competing business that the greatest difficulties are
caused by an expansive doctrine of corporate opportunity.
The extraordinarily difficult situation which directors with
conflicting obligations may find themselves in is illustrated by
what actually occurred in Peso Silver Mines . Cropper, the con
trolling director, and his associates purchased the claims which
were rejected by the Peso company. A new public company,
Mayo Silver Mines, was financed to develop these claims . Cropper
was then in the position of being a director and officer, and in
this case the dominant figure and person in charge of finances,
of two public companies with undeveloped silver properties in
the same area in the Yukon. How was he to conduct himself if
attractive claims were offered to him that were near the properties
of both companies? Surely it can make no difference whether the
offer came while he was in the office of one or the other com-
panies or, indeed, came during the course of a social occasion .
The old Regal test may be of some help if in fact one of the two
companies was actually interested in or negotiating for the prop-
erties . That company should clearly have a prior claim on
Cropper's loyalties with respect to that opportunity and it would
be a breach of duty for him to place it in the other company.
But if there was no prior interest the position is almost insoluble.
si Canada Business Corporations Act, supra, footnote 3, s. 115;
Ontario Business Corporations Act, supra, footnote 4, s. 134. If the director
declares the nature and extent of his interest and does not vote and the
other criteria are met, the contract is not voidable by reason only of the
director's interest therein . Neither statute requires an annual report to
the shareholders of those transactions in which the directors have been
interested in during the year . This information would be a useful addition
to the information circular that must accompany the mandatory proxy
solicitation and would have the merit of informing the company in
general meeting of those occasions on which its fiduciaries have been
excused from their duty by their fellow fiduciaries .
82Levieu v. Sinclair Oil Corp . (1969), 261 A. 2d 911, is a good
example of the legal difficulties posed for a parent company when it
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Are there degrees of interest which would give one of the com-
panies a prior claim; should the opportunity be offered to both
companies so that they might compete for it?83 And even apart
from opportunities the position is difficult . ]Flow does Cropper
act in an even-handed manner in raising money for the devel-
opment of both companies when there will only be a limited
amount of capital available for the development of properties in
the. same area? To ask these questions is to question the
accepted position that directors are free to engage in a competing
enterprise.
The first case which held that a director is free to act as a
director or otherwise be concerned in a competing business was
London and Mashonaland Exploration Co. v. New Mashonaland
Corporation Co.s4 The case was one in which it was sought to
restrain a dummy director who had never acted as a director or
attended a board meeting of the plaintiff company from acting
as a director of the rival defendant company. In dismissing the
motion, Chitty J. said that there was nothing in the plaintiff's
articles which prevented a director from acting as a director of
another company nor was there any allegation that confidential
information was about to be disclosed. Seen from the perspective
of cases like Canaero, Regal and Phipps v. Boardman, this brief
1891 decision seems to be too narrowly conceived. The matter is
not one of prohibition in the articles or the imminence of dis-
closure of confidential information but is one of the more
pervasive equitable injunction that a fiduciary must not put
himself in aposition where his duty and his interest may conflict .85
A different result was reached in the little noted case of
Re Thomson.s 6 Clauson J. held that it was a breach of duty for
83 Some of the possibilities are discussed in Note, Corporate Op-
portunity, op . cit ., footnote 32, at pp . 770-771 .
84 [18911 W.N . 165 .
85 The clearest example of an unthinking application of London and
Mashonaland Exploration is the decision of the Manitoba King's Bench
trial division in Waite's Auto Transfer Ltd. v. Waite, [1928] 3 W.W.R .
649 . The defendant who was a director, president and manager of the
plaintiff trucking company, left his employment with that company but
did not resign as president or director . He set up a competing business
and canvassed and secured some of his former customers . In refusing to
issue a restraining injunction, Donavan J . relied on London and Mashona-
land Exploration and further held that the defendant's knowledge of .and
business connections with former customers could not be considered
". . . to be property or money or material [of the plaintiff company]" . It is
not necessary to belabour the obvious inadequacies of Donavan J . 's
decision and it is sufficient to suggest that it cannot possibly survive
the judgment in Canaero.
86 [1930] 1 Ch. 203 .
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a trustee to open a business competitive with that run by the
trust and indicated that he would be prepared to issue an injunc-
tion .s 7 In so holding, he relied on the leading company law case
(as did Laskin J. in Canaero) of Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikiess
and Lord Cranworth's classic formulation that ". . . no [fiduciary]
. . . shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has,
or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which inay possibly
conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect" .s"
Another judgment cited in support of the principle that a
director may engage in competing activities is the dicta of Lord
Blanesburgh L.C . in Bell v. Lever Bros." The issue was not
directly before the House of Lords and Lord Blanesburgh cited
London and Mashonaland Exploration" to emphasize that not
only could a director enter into a contract outside the scope of
his employment in which his company was not interested (which
he conceived to be the instant case) but that he could go further
and even be a director of a rival concern:
. . . and what he could do for a rival company, he could . . . do for
himself.9=
The facts which Lord Blanesburgh used to make his point
were not even the facts of the case . The vital clause which
included directors' acts in the corporate agreements was put aside
for the purpose of his Lordship's discussion . It was only this
clause that, in his view, rendered the defendants liable "3 Lord
s7 The wrongs complained of had been remedied after the writ
was issued . For the purpose of costs, Clauson J . had only to determine
whether the defendant was entitled to the right he claimed which was
to open a competing business . Re Thomson was cited with approval by
Gibbs J . in the Australian High Court in Consul Development Pty. Ltd. v.
DPC Estates Pry. Ltd., supra, footnote 54, in terms which make it clear
that he would regard it as a breach of fiduciary duty for a director to
join a competing firm .
HH (1854) . 1 Macf. 461, [1843-60] All E.R . Rep. 249 (H.L .) .
s :" Ibid ., per Lord Cranworth L.C ., at p. 252 (All E.R . Rep.) .
(Emphasis added.)
Supra, footnote 13 .
"t Supra, footnote 84 .
"=Supra, footnote 13, at p. 195.
"s Lord Blanesburgh clearly was of the opinion that the directors
either had to cause injury to their company or make use of its property
or confidential information before they could be held liable for breach
of duty. See his discussion of this point at pp . 175 and 194, ibid.
I have attempted to show in the text above that this is an erroneous view
of the law and not in accord with the judgments in Regal, Phipps, Canaero
or Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley . As to acting for
a rival company, Lord Blanesburgh seemed to have forgotten that earlier
in his judgment (at p. 172, ibid .) he characterized the defendants' position
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Atkin, however, took a position that was more in accord with
current understanding of fiduciary duties and considered that the
directors hadviolated their trust apart from the particular clause .94
And what the directors could not do for themselves, they certainly
could not do for a rival concern. Neither Lord Atkin nor any of
the other judges who heard the case considered the question of a
director acting in a competitive capacity.
` The thinly reasoned and brief judgment on a motion in
London and Mashonaland Exploration, picked up in casual dicta
by a single law lord in Bell v. Lever Bros., seems an extremely
slender foundation upon which to have built such a broad excep-
tion to the precepts of fiduciary obligation . Clauson J.'s position
in Re Thomson, based as it was on the accepted principles of
Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie, is surely the correct one, particularly
in light of the more recent judgments of the House of Lords in
Regal and Phipps v. Boardman and of the Supreme Court in
Canaero. 1t may be that commercial usage makes it impractical
to suddenly restrain the practice of vertical interlocks, particularly
in the parent-subsidiary situation. But those who are party to
such interlocks should be aware of their tenuous legal position
and of the constant danger of being in breach of their duty to
either, or both, of their masters.95 At the least, a company's
articles should allow such interlocks on the approval of the
in working for both Levers and Niger as " . . . serving two masters . . . a
position as impossible today as it ever was" .
94 Lord Atkin did not mention the director's clause in the agreement
but described their conduct, rightly it is suggested, in terms which imply
liability apart from the clause and in terms which suggest what his
answer would be to the question of a director acting for a rival company :
"The appellants were acting in a business in which their employers were
concerned ; their interests and their employers' conflicted; . . : ' at p. 213,
ibid .
195 Some of the worst effects of London and lllashonaland Corporation
have been lessened by s . 210 of the English Companies Act, 1948, c . 38 .
S . 210 is replicated and strengthened in s . '234 of the new Canada
Business Corporations Act, supra, footnote 3 . S . 210 is also copied in
s. 221 of the British Columbia Companies Act, supra, footnote 4 . The
Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1970, does not contain any provision
similar to s . 210 .- The legislative committee which prepared the report
on which the new Ontario Act was based rejected s . 210 for the lame
reason that it would result in the courts "getting into business" . Now that
such jurisdictions as England, Canada (federally), Australia, South Africa,
India and Ireland have s . 210 provisions, it is to be hoped that Ontario
will follow suit and amend its Act to include this important protection
for shareholders .
In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd . v . Meyer, [1959]
A.C. 324, Lord Denning was referred to Lord Blanesburgh's dicta in
Bell v . Lever Bros. that a director could join the board of a rival company,
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shareholders in each specific instance before a director is per-
mitted to be interested in a competing enterprise .
Conclusion
The reach of Laskin J.'s judgment in Canaero is greater than an
expansion of the corporate opportunity doctrine . For it is a judg-
ment that, as befits the role of a country's Supreme Court, leaves
ample room within broad guidelines for the lower courts to work
out a jurisprudence of individual and corporate conduct com-
mensurate with the needs and realities of a complex corporate
economy. In one passage in particular, a passage which must be
seen in the light of the court's controversial decision in Peso,
Laskin J. lays the necessary foundation for jurisprudential
development in this area .
In the judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Peso96 Bull J.A . and Norris J.A ., both attempted to formulate a
general policy approach to corporate litigation . Bull J.A . was of
the view that in a time when "substantially all business . . . [is]
carried on through the corporate vehicle with the attendant com-
plexities involved by interlocking, subsidiary and associated corpo-
rations . . ." that it would not be enlightened to extend equity's
"salutary" rules. Moreover, care must be taken "to interpret them
in the light of modern practice and way of life".97 In his dissent,
Norris J.A . considered that it was the very complexities of modern
business that called for strict application and reinterpretation of
the equitable rules:98
With great respect, it seems to me that the complexities of modern
business are a very good reason why the rule should be enforced
strictly in order that such complexities may not be used as a smoke-
screen or shield behind which fraud might be perpetuated . . . .
In giving the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court in Peso,
Cartwright J . did not refer to this policy split . In Canaero, Laskin
J. deliberately picked up the theme and placed the court unequiv-
ocably on Norris J.A.'s side :99
. . . what these decisions indicate is an updating of the equitable prin-
ciple whose roots lie in the general standards that I have already
mentioned, namely, loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a conflict
to which he replied: "That may have been so at that time . But it is at the
risk now of an application under s. 210 if he subordinates the interest of
the one company to those of the other" .
96 (1966), 56 D.L.R . (2d) 117 (B.C.C.A .) .
97Ibid ., per Bull, LA., at pp. 154-155.
98Ibid ., per Norris, J.A., at p. 139.
99 Supra, footnote 7, at p. 384.
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of duty and self-interest . Strict application against directors and senior
management officials is simply recognition of the degree of control
which their positions give them in corporate operations, a control
which rises above day-to-day accountability to owning shareholders and
which comes under some scrutiny only at annual general or at special
meetings . It is a necessary supplement, in the public interest, of
statutory regulation and accountability which - themselves are, at
one and the same time, an acknowledgment of the importance of the
corporation in the life of the community and _of the need to compel
obedience by it and by its promoters, directors and managers to norms
of exemplary behaviour.
1n this passage and in his warning that his judgment was not to be
read as laying down rules to be applied as if it were a statute,oo
but rather that the standards of fiduciary duty "must be tested in .
each case by many factors which it would be reckless to attempt to
enumerate exhaustively""" there are echos of Cardozo J.'s
classic judgment almost half a century earlier in 1Vleinhard v.
Salmon.l°2 In that case, Cardozo J. spoke of equity's "animating
principle" that "refuses to confine within the bounds of classified
transactions its precepts of a loyalty that is undivided and un-
selfish. The standard -of loyalty . . . is without the fixed divisions of
a graduated scale" .1°3 From that case the courts of the United
States have gone on to create a jurisprudence of fiduciary obliga-
tion commensurate with the needs of an ever-expanding, ever-
more complex corporate economy. As the Supreme Court of
Canada enters its second century the spirit of its judgment in
Canaero can play the same pivotal role in fostering such a
development in Canada.
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